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An organization’s digital innovation capability, 
i.e., its ability to leverage (technological) trends and 
developments, is not only associated with opportunities 
but also entails challenges and risks. Various incidents 
underline the importance of cybersecurity in this 
context. While organizations in the automotive industry 
have recognized both as inevitable, they perceive a 
trade-off between their innovation and cybersecurity 
capabilities. As digital innovations are often 
prestigious, they might prioritize factors like time-to-
market and postpone cybersecurity to development and 
operations. To identify factors enabling organizations 
to balance the ambidextrous requirements of the two, we 
conducted an interview study in the automotive industry. 
Our findings indicate that organizational ambidexterity 
enabled by strategic and operational elements can 
minimize the trade-off and the associated risks, with 
implications for both theory and practice.  
1. Introduction 
Digital transformation and innovation capabilities 
of organizations have become imperative and have led 
to a paradigm shift, not just in the automotive industry 
[1]. The growing reliance on technology creates 
opportunities like connected cars but is also associated 
with new cybersecurity risks [2], as shown by recent 
incidents. For example, in 2021, security researchers 
managed to take over a Tesla via its infotainment system 
[3]. Due to increasing customer awareness, which 
affects the willingness to buy innovative products [4], 
cybersecurity needs to be considered in strategic 
decisions like business-model innovations [5]. 
In this context, organizations do not want to limit 
freedom and creativity too early [6]. At the same time, 
it is expensive to integrate cybersecurity too late, e.g., as 
technology decisions might have to be revoked [7]. 
While, for example, cybersecurity is often integrated 
into development and operations [8], it could make 
sense to consider the topic in the innovation or ideation 
phase. Consequently, innovativeness and cybersecurity 
are often regarded as ambidextrous. Organizations 
perceive a trade-off and struggle to find the right balance 
when integrating the two dimensions [9–11]. 
Organizational ambidexterity, enabling organizations to 
exploit established while exploring new opportunities 
[12], could represent a vital solution approach [13]. 
However, while the terms have been put into context, 
studies usually focus on balancing exploitation and 
exploration of cybersecurity mechanisms [14, 15]. The 
effect of ambidexterity on the ability to balance digital 
innovation and cybersecurity capabilities is scarcely 
researched [10].  
To examine these ambidextrous tensions between 
digital innovation and cybersecurity, the automotive 
industry is particularly suitable as this industry is 
characterized by a high level of dynamic and instability 
due to digital transformation. There is a large share of 
more traditional, rather formal multinationals coining 
competition [16]. As suggested [12], we did therefore 
decide to conduct an interview study in this specific 
industry and answer the research question: 
“What is the role of organizational ambidexterity 
in balancing digital innovation and cybersecurity 
capabilities in the German automotive industry?”  
2. Theoretical Background  
We understand innovation and cybersecurity as 
capabilities, i.e., the ability of “an organization, person 
or system” that “typically require[s] a combination of 
organization, people, processes and technology to 
achieve” [17]. Innovation capability, also called 
innovativeness or innovativity, refers to the ability to 
create and leverage (digital) innovations [18]. Driven by 
trends like car sharing, the automotive industry is under 
growing pressure to innovate in shortening innovation 
cycles [19]. Cybersecurity capability goes beyond the 
protection of information resources and includes the 
management and mitigation of the effect of cyberattacks 
on assets and human beings [20]. Examples, like the 
hack of a Jeep Cherokee [21], underline the relevance 
from an automotive perspective. 





Their ambidextrous characteristics and objectives 
can explain the need to balance digital innovation and 
cybersecurity capabilities [10]. The former deals with 
the freedom and creativity required for the agile 
adaptation of technological trends and their rapid market 
introduction to secure first-mover advantages [22]. As 
“organizations rush to modernize their systems and 
operations […] [they] introduce vulnerabilities across 
their businesses and expose themselves to a growing 
number of risks” [10]. The latter, however, is associated 
with risk prevention and management. Consequently, it 
is often not seen as added value but as the avoidance of 
possible losses [23]. Cybersecurity is considered 
complex, thus time-consuming as well as costly, and 
often heavily driven by policies and standards [24]. 
While expenditures for retrofitting cybersecurity could 
be prevented by early consideration [25], complex 
cybersecurity requirements might be perceived as 
obstacles if trying to gain a competitive advantage 
through the speed of innovation [26]. A trade-off can 
manifest itself in different, often mutually intensifying 
dimensions like department structures or performance 
requirements [11]. Thus, organizations need to find a 
balance between an innovation focus that might lead to 
cybersecurity gaps and a prioritization of cybersecurity 
that could decelerate the innovation process [2]. It is, 
however, not widely researched how to balance and 
integrate digital innovation and cybersecurity 
capabilities. Existing approaches focus on agile 
software development methodologies [e.g., 27] often 
used in innovation projects. They frequently ignore the 
organizational perspective and postpone cybersecurity 
to implementation, leading to increased costs and delays 
[28]. Others focus on a specific, innovative technology, 
e.g., the use of Big Data in IoT [e.g., 29].  
Due to the ambidextrous characteristics and 
objectives, we believe organizational ambidexterity 
might represent a framework enabling organizations to 
successfully deal with the conflict of digital innovation 
and cybersecurity. The concept describes the ability to 
simultaneously exploit current competencies and 
explore new opportunities [30]. While the former 
focuses on efficiency and refinement, flexibility and 
risk-taking are crucial for the latter [31]. Ambidextrous 
companies can handle the conflicting goals and thereby 
secure their competitiveness [12]. Contrary to the 
previous belief that the two stages of the innovation 
process, initiation and implementation, require separate 
organizational structures as ‘characteristics that 
facilitate the initiation of innovations impedes the 
implementation of innovations and vice-versa’ [32], 
recent research shows that this is not necessarily the case 
[33–36]. Various forms of organizational ambidexterity 
might positively impact corporate performance, e.g., 
structural ambidexterity, having separate units focused 
on alignment and adaptability [32], or contextual 
ambidexterity, taking a behavioral perspective and 
providing processes to differentiate within the same 
business unit [12]. These different forms can be 
categorized according to four tensions: differentiation 
vs. integration, individual vs. organizational level, static 
vs. dynamic perspective, and internal vs. external 
perspective [30].  
Schinagl et al. identify a tension between 
innovation and cybersecurity and use organizational 
ambidexterity theory as a frame. They observe that this 
tension is “mainly addressed from a one-sided ‘quid pro 
quo’ perspective” [10]. Instead of balancing integration 
and separation between the two capabilities, concepts 
like security by design do thus lead to conflicts [10]. 
Besides, the term ambidextrous cybersecurity has been 
used to describe the capability to protect information 
resources while leveraging technological innovations 
expressed in a stage-gate model [14]. Furthermore, the 
need for organizations to take a dual approach to 
cybersecurity response, i.e., to explore new while 
exploiting old mechanisms, has been examined, 
mapping 87 organizations to a 2x2 matrix [15]. 
Detached from organizational ambidexterity, a 
cybersecurity matrix has been proposed to rank 
companies’ ability to deal with the conflicting 
requirements. Thereby, the impact of cybersecurity on 
innovation projects depends on industry, as well as 
company factors, technology management practice, and 
technology maturity. Leadership, risk measurement, 
organizational structures, culture, education, and 
awareness are further influencing aspects [11]. The two 
domains do, however, not necessarily conflict. While 
innovativeness was not found to be significantly 
correlated with cybersecurity management [37], 
assertions regarding cybersecurity and scaling value of 
new companies suggest the former should be part of the 
unique selling point (USP). This can be enabled by a 
culture based on beliefs like the willingness to protect 
the company and its customers from cyberattacks [38].  
Focusing on the innovation perspective, culture 
and structures that promote flexibility positively affect 
innovation capability [39]. While both influence the 
cultural climate, productivity and efficiency can be 
increased if negative tensions are reduced while positive 
tensions are used [40]. Furthermore, innovation 
capability can be increased by separation and 
specialization creating freedom [41], as well as by 
information exchange and networking between 
explorative and exploitative departments [33]. 
Especially the integration of knowledge management 
can increase the efficiency of the innovation process 
[42]. Finally, innovativeness and risk management can 
coexist through appropriate leadership, enabling 
knowledge and identity development [43]. Enabling risk 
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assessments and management requires suitable methods 
[2], which differ per phase of the innovation life cycle 
[40]. Simpler techniques were found to fit the earlier and 
more complex quantitative methods the later phase [25]. 
From the cybersecurity perspective, the notion of 
a trade-off, e.g., regarding convenience [44] or data 
privacy [45], is not new. In this context, information 
asymmetry negatively influences the balance between 
business value and cybersecurity risk. In contrast, 
information sharing can promote proactive risk 
management and reduce the risk of cybersecurity under-
investment [46]. Regarding project management in 
general, risk assessments are expensive and time-
consuming. If they are performed before the project 
start, an agile IT security model can help organizations 
decide which projects to invest in. Applying this model 
does, however, require management commitment [47]. 
Another study recommends using cybersecurity 
capability maturity models to perform maturity self-
assessments and ‘design in’ cybersecurity. This does, in 
turn, require creating awareness among project 
managers [48]. As with the different phases of the 
innovation life cycle, project phases must be 
differentiated. Based on a literature analysis regarding 
known breaches, risks can already arise during 
conception, can result from harmless activities, and 
effects can occur long after completion [49]. 
Our study aims to validate the assumption 
regarding the role of organizational ambidexterity, 
considering previously identified factors from the 
literature such as management awareness and early 
integration [32], while remaining open to additional 
factors mentioned by interviewees. We aim to gather 
these factors and formulate research propositions that 
can be further examined by a more in-depth study. 
3. Methodology 
Intending to conduct a first initial explorative study, 
we opted for an open, inductive research approach. 
Aiming to derive implications where causes and 
correlations are mainly unknown, we chose a qualitative 
study design using semi-structured expert interviews 
with mostly open-ended questions [50]. Based on the 
theoretical background, an interview guideline with five 
sections was created. After a brief introduction of our 
study, including relevant definitions, the first section 
covers the introduction of the interviewee. Interview 
partners were asked to describe projects within the 
automotive industry they were involved in and the role 
of cybersecurity in these. The second section deals with 
the balance of innovativeness and cybersecurity. This 
includes, for example, questions regarding a trade-off 
between the two, as well as regarding risks and 
challenges in this context. Besides, we asked about the 
prioritization of digital innovation or cybersecurity. The 
third section focuses on the strategic level and aims to 
determine which role the management plays in finding 
a balance between the two domains, whether managers 
are willing to take risks to speed up time to market and 
how prerequisites for finding a balance are created. The 
fourth section concentrates on the operational level in 
terms of interfaces between project teams, innovation, 
as well as cybersecurity capability, and their 
collaboration. Among others, transparency, as well as 
responsibilities within the teams, were examined, and 
decision-making processes were addressed. A final 
section tried to ensure all relevant aspects were covered. 
The data collection was conducted in cooperation 
with a leading digital transformation consultancy. Our 
partner firm has units specialized in digital innovation 
and cybersecurity, focusing on global players in the 
automotive industry, thus possessing the required 
expertise. Since cybersecurity is a sensitive topic for 
which acquiring interview partners requires trust, our 
network within the company represented a valuable 
opportunity. The cooperation with a consultancy 
enables us to gain multi-faceted insights into various 
client projects simultaneously. Thus, care was taken to 
ensure that our interview partners contributed their 
experience from different clients to ensure a holistic 
perspective detached from organization-specific 
settings. To confirm that our interviewees’ insight into 
organization-internal affairs was sufficient, we 
interviewed employees directly working for a market-
leading automotive OEM. Furthermore, to rule out that 
our partner’s consultants were biased, we interviewed 
an employee from a second consultancy. Potential 
interviewees were contacted with a one-pager providing 
background information on our study. Interview 
partners were selected based on their experience 
regarding digital innovation and cybersecurity 
capability in the automotive industry. All interviewees 
have at least six years of professional experience and 
have been part of the core team of multiple digital 
innovation projects, in which cybersecurity aspects had 
to be considered. Therefore, we focused on interviewing 
partners with a leadership role, defining strategies 
according to which these projects run. Furthermore, we 
took care to find interviewees with a distinct focus, from 
different organizational levels and business units, as 
well as with work experience in or, in the case of 
consultants, with other companies [50]. The interviews 
took place between May 5th and May 28th, 2020, and 
were recorded (see Table 1 for an overview). 
Conducting the interviews in German, the native 
language of all participants, ensured unambiguous 
communication and the elimination of language barriers 
[51]. Interview recordings were transcribed for data 
analysis. As communicated to all participants, the 
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conversations were anonymized to ensure company-
specific information remains confidential. Next, we 
created a code system by clustering statements from the 
transcripts. This code system consists of main 
categories, split into sub-categories, summarizing 
various codes (see Table 2 for an excerpt). The first 
main category, ‘General importance and trade-off’, is, 
for example, subdivided into ‘Importance due to digital 
transformation’ or ‘Trade-off between innovation and 
cybersecurity’. These codes aim to cluster the results 
regarding the need to consider cybersecurity and the 
justifications for a trade-off. The second main category, 
‘Strategic level’, consists of sub-categories like 
‘Corporate culture’, ‘Management awareness and 
commitment’, or ‘Organizational structures’. They 
summarize the significance of culture, the importance 
attributed by leadership, and organizational structures in 
finding a balance. Finally, the third main category, 
‘Operational level’, is, among others, subdivided into 
‘Communication’, ‘Processual integration’, and 
‘Decision-making processes’. Under these codes, we 
clustered insights regarding the operational level, 
focusing on communication, risk management, timing, 
and decision-making. 
Table 1. Overview of Interview Partners 
ID Level/ Unit Focus Experience Affiliation Duration 
1 Manager; Digital Acceleration IT strategy, operating model 10 years Consultancy 1 34:27 min 
2 Manager; Digital Services & Platform e-Commerce, IT strategy 12 years Consultancy 1 21:13 min 
3 Senior Consultant; Automotive Customer experience 11 years Consultancy 1 26:18 min 
4 Senior Manager; Inventive Finance,  
Risk and Compliance 
Data management, process 
optimization 
6 years Consultancy 1 33:33 min 
5 Consultant; Automotive Digital  Brand and customer experience 8 years Consultancy 1 46:59 min 
6 Vice President; Automotive Sales, strategic transformations 22 years Consultancy 1 26:05 min 
7 Managing Partner Consulting Europe  Innovation Lead EMEA  23 years Consultancy 2 28:01 min 
8 Specialist Org. Design Processes and organization 15 years Automotive 23:19 min 
9 Specialist Research Research automotive security 6 years Automotive 32:55 min 
Table 2. Code system (Excerpt) 
4. Findings 
4.1. General Importance and Trade-Off 
Regarding the relevance of innovativeness and 
cybersecurity for the automotive industry, our 
interviewees stated that the digitalization of existing and 
the creation of innovative business models have become 
a necessity. Increasing investments show that premium 
manufacturers have understood this (I6). However, 
companies like Apple, Google, and Tesla are ahead in 
innovations (I2, I6) “because cybersecurity is a very 
integral part of their business” (I1). Besides their 
innovativeness, their reputation is not immune to 
damage from cybersecurity incidents (I5). Due to the 
multitude of databases, interfaces, as well as channels to 
customers, dealers, and third parties in various markets 
(I6), cybersecurity risks were considered relatively high 
in this industry. Developments associated with digital 
innovations, like increasing data volume, lead to the 
need to secure the vehicle (I6, I9) and the data flow to it 
to prevent a loss and misuse of both customer as well as 
company data (I5, I6). Therefore, it is necessary to 
constantly raise cybersecurity maturity and consider 
new technologies like quantum-secure encryption (I9). 
Consequently, cybersecurity is recognized as integral, 
and a holistic approach embedded in the digital strategy 
can even result in competitive advantages (I1, I4). 
Main category Sub-categories Example 
General importance and 
trade-off 
Importance due to digital 
transformation 
“Digital business models only work with very strong and 
functioning IT security.” (I1) 
 Trade-off between innovation 
and cybersecurity 
“The biggest challenge is to find the right trade-off.” (I2) 
 
Strategic level Corporate culture “You need tolerance on all sides. In an innovation team, I 
naturally have very different cultures.” (I8) 
 Management awareness and 
commitment 
“Management only wants the issues to be dealt with.” (I4) 
Operational level Processual integration “And what we can learn or do better is to always integrate 
cyber experts directly into the teams from the beginning.” (I6) 
 Decision-making processes “With cybersecurity, we don’t have a decision-making process 
[…] as it would be the case with legal or integration.” (I3) 
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Five interviewees saw a trade-off between 
innovativeness and cybersecurity (I2-I4, I7, I8), while 
another two partly agreed or gave examples of such a 
trade-off later (I1, I5). The remaining two stated that 
cybersecurity risks should never be accepted (I6, I9). 
They consider cybersecurity to largely depend on the 
technical architecture and understand the existence of a 
trade-off as an indicator that it is ill-designed (I6). Our 
interviewees argue that ideally there shouldn’t be any 
trade-offs. However, their experience shows that this 
often is not (yet) the case in practice. Interviewees 
perceiving a trade-off agreed that cybersecurity should 
ideally be a zero-tolerance issue, as cybersecurity 
breaches can render innovations obsolete (I7). They 
consider the time-to-market as the primary reason for 
this trade-off since this is “becoming increasingly 
important in today’s world” (I2). According to them, 
testing minimum viable products (MVP) with customers 
as early as possible is essential. Despite knowledge 
about the importance of cybersecurity (I1; I3), 
companies do thus focus on an early go-live (I7) and 
core features promoting sales (I3). This is partly 
explained by the intangible benefit of cybersecurity (I3, 
I7), although shortcomings can lead to easily hackable 
products (I7). Furthermore, innovators fear that the 
involvement of cybersecurity experts might lead to a 
negative attitude towards technologies and reduce 
innovativeness (I1, I3). The same is true for having to 
compromise between secure and attractive solutions 
(I5). The cumbersome coordination with those 
responsible for cybersecurity might delay the innovation 
process (I1, I2, I4, I5), at worst resulting in the go-to-
market being stopped (I2, I4, I5). Innovation projects 
being prestigious does, then, paradoxically lead to less 
attention being paid to regulations and cybersecurity not 
being integrated (I2-I4, I7). This effect is higher for 
internal, procedural than for customer-facing 
innovations (I4). The trade-off was considered 
important (I8) and potentially the biggest challenge in 
dealing with the two aspects (I2). Finding the right 
balance and increasing the cybersecurity maturity of 
innovations while maintaining agility and speed (I7) 
requires a pragmatic approach (I2, I3). 
In terms of balancing innovation and cybersecurity 
capabilities, and as suggested in P2, our interview 
partners underlined the importance of organizational 
ambidexterity created by various factors (I1-I7). These 
factors are differentiated between strategic and 
organizational level. 
4.2. Strategic Level 
Organizational culture, awareness & commitment, 
and organizational structures were named influencing 
factors on the strategic level.  
The perception of cybersecurity as a roadblock 
rooted in the organizational culture (I2, I4) was 
explained by a bilateral lack of tolerance by one 
interviewee. He claimed that both sides lack the 
willingness to open up, understand that both work 
differently, and collaborate (I7). An ideal culture was 
underlined to lead to tolerance for the different 
personalities of experts based on the understanding that 
investments in innovations are financed by the core 
business, which secures the company’s future (I7). A 
start-up feeling with openness to risks created in centers 
of excellence or innovation hubs allows projects to 
develop freely (I8). While innovation was said to require 
safe spaces to experiment without consequences, guard 
rails were considered necessary to avoid risks when the 
go-life is forthcoming (I7).  
Only three interviewees were convinced that the 
level of cybersecurity awareness in the automotive 
industry is appropriate (I6, I8, I9). Another five thought 
that there is awareness, without it leading to the topic 
being sufficiently considered in terms of 
implementation (I1-I5). As depicted above, 
cybersecurity is still considered less important than 
innovativeness (I2, I3), although the recognized 
importance of the topic increases (I2, I3, I5), e.g., driven 
by data integration (I5). In the context of innovation 
capabilities, our interviewees saw a need to improve the 
awareness for and the integration of cybersecurity (I1, 
I5). Without this, the consideration of cybersecurity is 
often merely a coincidence and does, for example, 
depend on a team member’s earlier experiences (I3). If 
cybersecurity becomes an organization-wide 
requirement and projects must develop a technical 
architecture blueprint considering the topic, this was 
stated to be different (I9). 
The lack of management commitment to consider 
cybersecurity despite potential consequences for 
innovativeness was considered another major challenge 
(I1, I3, I4), as “the management is not involved at all” 
(I2). Due to the amount of risk associated with 
cybersecurity (I6, I8, I9), this should be self-evident, but 
for the reasons depicted above, it often is not (I1-I4, I7). 
While innovativeness is positively incentivized, 
cybersecurity is often only driven by fear of negative 
consequences for management (I6). As there is much 
attention on data privacy due to EU GDPR penalties, 
cybersecurity risks are often further de-prioritized (I3). 
Furthermore, explicit knowledge in terms of integrating 
cybersecurity was reported to decrease with increasing 
hierarchy level (I4) since “the required skills are 
available in most companies but not understood at the 
management level (I1). In the long run, only awareness 
and management commitment to deal with the topic, not 
solely because of regulatory requirements, will ensure 
that issues like limited cybersecurity resources are 
Page 6397
addressed (I2, I3). As one of our interviewees 
underlined, in Germany and Europe, more attention is 
already being paid than in the USA (I7). However, only 
two interviewees could refer to examples of high 
awareness and commitment (I8, I9). 
Awareness and management commitment are 
expressed in organizational structures, starting with 
the Chief Information Security Officer. Without this 
function, cybersecurity is perceived as less important 
(I1). The impact of this role was said to depend on the 
function being reported to, as, for example, a Chief 
Financial Officer was considered more likely to be risk-
averse than a Chief Marketing Officer (I1, I7). 
Establishing an innovation board representing both 
innovativeness and cybersecurity (I7) was mentioned as 
a best practice. In addition, a structural separation of 
exploration and exploitation was considered necessary 
(I1-I7). It does, however, not exist in every company, 
which was declared a mistake (I7). While essential to 
achieve effectiveness in innovations (I1-I7), this 
separation was claimed to lead to the neutrality required 
for their correct assessment from a cybersecurity 
perspective (I8). It can, however, lead to a disconnect 
from given frame conditions and silo-thinking. To 
overcome this, the separation on a structural level 
should be bridged through regular exchange with line 
functions and interdisciplinary teams on a project level 
(I1, I4). This requires tailor-made solutions and 
processes as these for exploration often do not fit 
exploitation and vice-versa (I8). Consequently, the 
existence of central and decentral cybersecurity units 
was considered positive (I1, I8). Balancing between 
centralization and decentralization requires flexibility 
and units with specific skills from which teams can be 
formed depending on objectives (I7). Even outside 
innovation units, organizations need to quickly adapt 
their organizational structure, as the development of 
process innovations needs resources while automation 
reduces routine activities freeing them (I8). 
4.3. Operational Level 
Communication, early integration, risk 
management, and decision-making processes were 
named as influencing factors on the operational level. 
According to our interviewees, the lack of awareness 
and knowledge to integrate cybersecurity into 
innovation capabilities is also common on this level (I3, 
I4). The involvement of cybersecurity experts is 
associated with a focus shift from building innovative 
solutions to managing risks (I2, I4) as “innovation takes 
a back seat to meet some crazy requirements” (I2). 
Complex cybersecurity requirements (I1, I2, I4) quickly 
become obstacles that block the implementation and 
prevent the go-live (I2, I4). They are associated with 
higher costs and sales price (I4, I9), which leads to the 
perception of cybersecurity being hindering (I1, I2, I4). 
Regular communication, structured information 
exchange, and collaboration between innovation and 
cybersecurity capability were reported to be vital in 
establishing guard rails for innovations. They are 
required to ensure a timely, risk-based integration, as 
well as quick decision-making (I1-I4, I6). From a 
holistic perspective, the lack of communication leads to 
innovation teams developing solutions in isolation. 
They invest time and money without knowing whether 
they will get the cybersecurity’s approval (I5). From the 
innovation capability’s perspective, communication and 
knowing relevant counterparts can significantly 
contribute to project speed, as an informal exchange 
does then suffice in many cases (I2, I4). While this is 
often already the case for data privacy due to the EU 
GDPR, it is yet to be established for cybersecurity (I3). 
Seven interviewees stated that an early integration 
of cybersecurity into innovations is needed (I1, I3, I5-
I9). They agreed that the topic is often integrated too late 
as innovation teams “build their playground” (I1, I4) 
instead of “creating secure sandboxes to test and 
approve innovations” (I7). Often, cybersecurity reviews 
are conducted at the end of the implementation phase, 
before go-life (I2-I4), and “no one from IT security is 
involved right from the start” (I4). This can result in 
additional pressure on the cybersecurity capability (I7) 
and intensifies the disconnect (I2). Only two 
interviewees had experienced cybersecurity being 
discussed in an early workshop (I1, I5). Another two had 
experience with cybersecurity integrated into the 
evaluation phase when it is decided if an idea should be 
further invested into (I7, I9). To ensure an early 
integration, a criteria catalog to be fulfilled by 
innovations can help (I7, I9), although it might have to 
be regularly extended due to the increasing impact of 
cybersecurity (I9). This, or the integration into technical 
conception and architecture, both supported by the 
cybersecurity capability (I2), were considered best 
practices. Like this, cybersecurity can become 
indispensable and self-evident (I5), an essential 
requirement like data privacy (I5, I6). 
Cybersecurity risk management and perception 
(I2, I5) were mentioned as key factors regarding the 
balance between innovation and cybersecurity. When 
asked about the digital innovations they have worked 
on, about 50% of the interviewees acknowledged that 
early versions might have been hackable (I3, I4, I6-I8). 
All others considered their innovations secure, and the 
security mechanisms implemented sufficient (I1, I2, I5, 
I9). Besides by a lack of awareness, this inhomogeneous 
risk perception was explained by the complexity of risk 
assessments in large companies and system landscapes 
(I7). Interview partners admitted this could be disastrous 
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when innovations have interfaces to systems requiring 
high security (I7, I8). If risk assessments are performed, 
these assessments are neither critically evaluated nor put 
into relation to the limitations their mitigation would 
impose on the innovation (I2). Integrating cybersecurity 
risk assessments in the innovation process was 
considered beneficial. However, it was deemed 
necessary to make risks tangible as with EU GDPR (I5). 
If the consequences of a cybersecurity breach are 
perceived to be less drastic, the issue will be de-
prioritized (I5), and security gaps might result (I3). 
Missing coordination, the lack of a structured 
decision-making process with suitable interfaces, and 
the unavailability of experts to support this process were 
said to be further limiting factors (I3, I7). This lengthy 
process usually results in too many, too complex 
requirements (I1, I2, I4). For the, in some respects, 
heavily regulated automotive industry, the usage of 
external, open-source software components while 
considering complex, internal regulations (I7), as well 
as the cooperation with suppliers, were mentioned as 
incredibly challenging examples. The latter often 
requires the same certification as for security-critical 
departments. These requirements can often not be met 
by start-ups involved in the innovation process, for 
which more flexible approaches need to be found (I7). 
5. Discussion  
As indicated by existing research [2, 11], experts in 
the automotive industry perceive a trade-off between 
digital innovation and cybersecurity capabilities, stating 
the prioritization of the former as the key reason. While 
cybersecurity can add value for customers, innovation 
often takes precedence in prestigious projects. Thus, 
cybersecurity risks arise by focusing on sales features 
and time-to-market strengthened by factors like the 
difficulty of risk assessments, for example, due to 
limited cybersecurity resources [25, 43, 49].  
This paper tried to determine the role of 
organizational ambidexterity to overcome this trade-off. 
As suggested by the literature on cybersecurity in 
specific [10], as well as on exploratory and exploitative 
capabilities in general [12, 30], our interviewees 
considered organizational ambidexterity essential in 
finding a balance between innovation and cybersecurity 
capability. Even though literature suggests that rigid 
organizational structures impede organizations from 
simultaneously meeting the requirements of both [9], 
structural ambidexterity, i.e., the separation between 
explorative and exploitative business units, was 
regarded as necessary. According to our interviewees, 
innovativeness requires a certain failure culture and a 
degree of freedom, while the standardization enabled by 
centralization benefits cybersecurity. Our findings 
suggest that it is beneficial to bridge this structural 
separation depending on the risks associated with an 
innovation, i.e., to combine aspects of structural and 
contextual ambidexterity. This has, to our knowledge, 
not been proposed so far and can, according to our 
interviewees, be enabled by factors on both a strategic 
and operational level.  
Regarding the strategic level, it was confirmed that 
the role of innovativeness and cybersecurity in strategy, 
vision, and business models must continuously be 
questioned [1]. Conforming with the literature [26], this 
leads to the importance of a holistic cybersecurity 
strategy covering innovation capabilities. A corporate 
culture promoting tolerance [39] and managers with the 
necessary understanding that show the required 
commitment to balance innovation and risks [43] like 
cybersecurity will result. Flexible, hybrid organizational 
structures, like centralized and decentralized 
cybersecurity resources [11, 12, 30, 32], are another 
essential countermeasure to prevent cybersecurity from 
being perceived as less important than innovation and 
not being adequately addressed [11, 47]. 
Concerning the organizational level, our research 
emphasizes the need for a risk-based and early 
integration of cybersecurity into the innovation process, 
which overlaps with literature findings [47]. Pragmatic 
approaches to compare risks with potential 
disadvantages for innovativeness [3, 44] can thus 
become relevant. Overall, they can help to minimize 
expensive and time-consuming projects [25]. However, 
as emphasized in the literature, interview partners 
criticize the missing communication, e.g., a regular and 
structured exchange and collaboration between both 
innovation and cybersecurity capabilities. Transparent 
communication and decision-making processes must be 
implemented, enabling the seamless integration of 
cybersecurity [11]. Like this, the conflict between the 
two capabilities can proactively be minimized while 
maximizing efficiency and effectiveness.  
We have summarized our findings in a set of 
research propositions to be verified in future studies: 
Proposition 1 (P1): Organizations in the 
automotive industry perceive a trade-off and prioritize 
innovation over cybersecurity in new products and 
business models. 
Proposition 2 (P2): Organizational ambidexterity 
enabled by strategic and operational elements is 
significant in finding this balance. 
Proposition 3 (P3): On a strategic level, corporate 
culture, management awareness & commitment, and 
organizational structures enable organizational 
ambidexterity in terms of digital innovation and 
cybersecurity. 
Proposition 4 (P4): On an operational level, 
transparent communication, risk-based & early 
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integration, and clearly defined decision-making 
processes support finding the balance between digital 
innovation and cybersecurity. 
Our propositions are hierarchically related. 
Elements on the strategic influence those on the 
operational level and jointly lead to increased 
organizational ambidexterity. This, in turn, influences 
the balance of digital innovation and cybersecurity 
capability and leads to organizational benefits, like 
improved innovation output and fewer cyber incidents. 
Our study provides various contributions. From a 
theoretical perspective, we created a short overview of 
the literature regarding the trade-off between innovation 
and cybersecurity. To our knowledge, the role of 
organizational ambidexterity in this context constitutes 
a research gap. Especially as our interviewees proposed 
to bridge structural ambidexterity with contextual 
elements, our results hint at a potential expansion of 
organizational ambidexterity theory. Therefore, our 
study contributes insights concerning several 
influencing factors summarized in our research 
propositions. As we focus on governance, instead of 
methodology or technology aspects more thoroughly 
researched in the context of cybersecurity and 
innovativeness, we believe our findings to be of high 
relevance. From a practitioner’s perspective, we think 
that the identified factors can, after further validation, 
serve as a frame of reference for organizations trying to 
balance innovation and cybersecurity. These can be 
used to ensure that both strategic and operational 
perspectives are considered. However, as organizations 
are different, these influencing factors must be adapted 
to the specific characteristics and requirements. 
Besides its contributions, this paper has some 
limitations. Due to the relatively small number of 
interviews, it can only be considered an initial 
exploration. As it proved difficult to find interview 
partners from the automotive industry, we decided to 
conduct expert interviews with management consultants 
and verify them against a small number of automotive 
industry employees. While consultants can undoubtedly 
provide valuable insights, they might lack insights and 
information for an unbiased assessment of client 
organizations. Besides, since interviewees can only 
provide their personal experience, the interview partner 
selection may have affected the results. Our interview 
questionnaire specified certain aspects to ensure their 
discussion during the interviews. Although we 
formulated questions carefully, this might have 
influenced our interviewees. The evaluation may be 
methodically biased, which we tried to counteract 
through member checking. Still, findings remain subject 
to interpretation [52]. Conducting the interviews in 
German eases communication but leads to potential 
inaccuracies due to translation. While our findings 
might not be limited to the automotive industry, they 
have only been verified in discussions with fellow 
researchers and must be evaluated in practice. Finally, 
we did intentionally focus on the governance 
perspective. A holistic approach would require 
integrating implementation methodology- or 
technology-specific findings. 
These limitations lead to a potential for further 
research. To create a holistic view on balancing 
innovativeness and cybersecurity and verify the 
identified influencing factors, a survey with a 
significantly higher number of participants is required. 
Since the findings may not be exhaustive, further 
research could aim to expand them. It would be 
interesting to measure their contribution in balancing 
innovation and cybersecurity. Even though our 
interviewees provided valuable and far-reaching 
insights, it would thereby be important to focus on 
internal employees of the automotive industry. In 
addition, it would be of interest to analyze the factors in 
different companies in the automotive industry and 
other industries. It could be revealing to choose an 
industry with comparable characteristics in which 
organizational ambidexterity is equally important. 
Doing so, company- or industry-specific adaptations of 
our findings could be derived, which would again have 
to be tested for practical relevance. 
As the balance between innovation and 
cybersecurity is increasing in relevance, we hope that 
our findings will help to improve organizational 
ambidexterity in this context. Secure innovations could 
result, leading to competitive advantages for 
organizations and better products for customers. 
Appendix. Interview Guideline 
Opening [36] 
• Could you please introduce yourself? 
• In the context of which project have you already been 
involved with innovations in the automotive industry?  
• How innovative do you think it is compared to the 
competition? Is it more of a laggard or a pioneer in the 
industry in terms of innovation/ cybersecurity?  
Innovation & Cyber Security [11, 48] 
• Do you see risks in the use of innovations? Which ones? 
Do solutions already exist to minimize them? 
• Have you worked on an innovation that was found to be 
potentially “hackable” at an early stage? Which 
innovation, to what extent was it hackable? 
• How would you describe the importance of cybersecurity 
aspects in the projects? Is there a high priority attributed 
relative to the implementation of innovations? 
• At what point in a project is cybersecurity integrated?  
• Do you see the need to consider cybersecurity more 
strongly in the context of innovation projects? 
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• Has a project ever been canceled early due to 
cybersecurity concerns? 
• In your opinion, is there a trade-off between digital 
innovations and cybersecurity? 
• Can you give an example of where the balance between 
driving digital innovation and a focus on cybersecurity 
has been exceptionally well or particularly poorly? 
• What are the challenges you see in dealing with 
innovation and cybersecurity? 
• Why do they exist, and how can they be eliminated? E.g., 
early integration of cybersecurity in innovation  
• Are there factors that are holding the innovation project 
back? Which ones? 
Strategic level [12, 33, 34] 
• What role does management play in shaping the 
innovation process regarding the integration of 
cybersecurity?  
• Are managers willing and able to accept risk if this has a 
positive impact on speed and time-to-market?  
• Does management focus on the capabilities required to 
implement the overall strategy/vision with respect to 
innovation and cybersecurity? 
• Does segregation of duties exist with respect to 
exploration (i.e., new product development) and 
exploitation (e.g., efficiency improvement or product 
quality)? How would you describe and rate this? 
Organizational and operational level [33, 36] 
• How is the innovation process shaped at the customer 
level? Rather through team innovations or by 
implementing existing innovations? 
• How would you evaluate the interfaces between your 
project team and the cybersecurity department? Does 
collaboration take place, or does cybersecurity remain 
ignored if it is not part of the project?  
• Is there a dedicated function/expert in the project teams 
who takes over the interface function? How is 
transparency ensured among all project participants?  
• How has the work with the teams in the cybersecurity/ 
innovation department been structured? How is 
cybersecurity included in innovation projects? 
• How is the decision-making process regarding 
cybersecurity for innovations? Which decisions must be 
approved by the cybersecurity function, and which ones 
can be made by the project team?  
• To what extent does speed/time-to-market suffer because 
of these decision-making processes? 
Conclusion 
• This concludes the structured part of the interview. Is 
there anything else you would like to add?  
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